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GETTING NORMATIVE: THE ROLE OF
NATURAL RIGHTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
Randy E. Barnett*
Our next question must be whether we can reconcile our natu-
ral law past with our textualist present-and whether we even
want to.
-Suzanna Sherry'
INTRODUCTION: THE NATURAL LAW REVIVAL
We are in the midst of a natural law revival. Not since the
Hart-Fuller debate2 in the wake of Nuremberg has legal
academia witnessed such interest in the topics of natural law and
natural rights.3 While this development may be only the most
recent aspect of the now several decades old revival of normative
legal philosophy that I chronicled some ten years ago,4 the imme-
diate cause of this interest was, of course, the nomination of Clar-
ence Thomas to the Supreme Court of the United States. The
* Professor, Boston University School of Law. This paper was presented at the
Conference on Liberalism, Modernity, and Natural Law, sponsored by the .American
Public Philosophy Institute, the Symposium on Rights sponsored by the philosophy de-
partment of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, and to faculty workshops at
Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount University, Rutgers-Camden School of Law, and
Boston University School of Law. Participants in these gatherings made many valuable
suggestions for improvement. I also wish especially to thank Jules Coleman, Bob Bone
and Richard Hyland for commenting on earlier drafts and Saba Khairi for her research
assistance.
1. Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 171, 222 (1992).
2. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L.
Rev. 593 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958).
3. Three recent issues of law reviews have been largely devoted to the topic. See
Natural Law Symposium, 38 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 1 (1990); Symposium: Perspectives on Nat-
ural Law, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1-222 (1992); Commentary on Constitutional Positivism, 25
Conn. L. Rev. 831-946 (1993). The latter consists of papers responding to Frederick
Schauer's article, Constitutional Positivism, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 797 (1993).
4. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Phi-
losophy, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1223 (1984) (book review).
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influence of this event on the academic imagination grew out of
what were actually a series of events.
First came the criticism of Supreme Court nominee and for-
mer Judge Robert Bork-most forcefully pressed by Senate Judi-
ciary Chairman Joseph Biden-for failing to take seriously the
background rights of citizens. Exhibit number one for Biden was
Bork's now-famous comparison of the Ninth Amendment to an
"ink blot" which appears on the Constitution.5 Subsequent
Supreme Court nominees were required to pledge their fealty to
the constitutional principle that "[t]he enumeration in the Con-
stitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or dis-
parage others retained by the people."6 These events unleashed
a scholarly excursion into the meaning of this neglected provision
that was unprecedented in American legal history.7 As a result,
we can no longer ignore this unrepealed constitutional injunction
on the grounds that it is a complete mystery.8
Before the dust from this interest in the "rights retained by
the people" had settled, President Bush nominated for the
Supreme Court Judge Clarence Thomas-a man who, in his
speeches and writings, seemingly favored using natural law when
interpreting the Constitution.9 As a result three rather startling
events occurred in rapid succession. First, in complete contrast
5. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on the
Judiciary 249 (1989) (testimony of Robert Bork):
I do not think you can use the ninth amendment unless you know something of
what it means. For example, if you had an amendment that says "Congress shall
make no" and then there is an ink blot and you cannot read the rest of it and
that is the only copy you have, I do not think you the court make up what might
be under the ink blot if you cannot read it.
6. U.S. Const. Amend. IX. For an appendix reproducing the testimony of Robert
Bork, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, and Clarence Thomas concerning the Ninth
Amendment, unenumerated rights and natural law, see 2 Randy E. Barnett, ed., The
Rights Retained by the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment 427-508
(George Mason U. Press, 1993).
7. For a representative sample of this post-Borkian scholarly debate (and a bibliog-
raphy of other Ninth Amendment scholarship), see id.
8. Not that this scholarship has prevented Bork himself from doing so. See Robert
H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 183 (Free Press,
1990) ("There is almost no history that would indicate what the ninth amendment was
intended to accomplish.").
9. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 63, 63-64
(1989):
[N]atural rights and higher law arguments are the best defense of liberty
and of limited government. Moreover, without recourse to higher law, we aban-
don our best defense of judicial review-a judiciary active in defending the Con-
stitution, but judicious in its restraint and moderation. Rather than being a
justification of the worst type of judicial activism, higher law is the only alterna-
tive to the willfulness of run-amok majorities and run-amok judges.
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to the arguments used in opposition to Robert Bork, critics of
Judge Thomas immediately reacted by characterizing his interest
in natural law as kooky and outside the mainstream.lo Second,
this fledgling campaign was then completely undercut by Chair-
man Biden's ringing endorsement of natural law in his opening
statement during the hearings. Remaining true to his stance dur-
ing prior hearings, Senator Biden endorsed the priority of natural
law but said, for him, the important question to be answered by
the hearings was which version of natural law the nominee
adopted."1 By taking this stance, the other Democratic senators
were effectively disabled from ridiculing the natural law position.
Then, with the stage so dramatically set, Judge Thomas emphati-
cally rejected the position he had seemingly endorsed and main-
tained that natural law had no role to play in constitutional
adjudication,12 thereby depriving Senator Biden of his debate
over the proper version of natural law. Thus in a matter of weeks
the natural law issue was forcefully laid upon the table for na-
tional consideration, and scholars then proceeded to continue the
debate in the law reviews.13
10. The most noteworthy of these critics was Professor Laurence Tribe, who charac-
terized Judge Thomas as "the first Supreme Court nominee in 50 years to maintain that
natural law should be readily consulted in constitutional interpretation." Laurence H.
Tribe, 'Natural Law' and the Nominee, N. Y. Tunes, July 15, 1991, at A15. For a list of
others who criticized Thomas' reliance on natural law, see Ken Masugi, Natural Right and
Oversight: The Use and Abuse of "Natural Law" in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 9 Pol.
Communication 231, 235-37 (1992).
11. See Appendix B: Testimony of Recent Supreme Court Nominees Concerning the
Ninth Amendmen4 Unenumerated Rights, and Natural Law, in Barnett, ed., 2 Rights Re-
tained by the People at 489 (cited in note 6) (statement of Senator Biden):
And there's a third type of natural law, Judge. It's the one that mirrors how
the Supreme Court has understood our Constitution for the bulk of this century.
And it's the one that I believe most Americans subscribe to. It is this view of
natural law that I believe-I personally, to be up front about it-think is appro-
priate. It is this view of natural law, the Constitution should protect personal
rights falling within the zone of privacy, speech and religion the most zealously.
Those rights that fall within that zone should not be restricted by a moral code
imposed on us by the Supreme Court or by unjust laws passed in legislative
bodies.
12. Although construing Thomas' writing as endorsing the use of natural law in con-
stitutional adjudication is not unreasonable, his former aide and speech writer denies that
he ever advocated such a practice. See Masugi, 9 Pol. Communication at 248 n.45 (cited
in note 10) ("To my knowledge, Thomas in his pre-judicial writings never used the term
constitutional adjudication."). For a defense of the coherence of this position, see Russell
Hittinger, Natural Law in the Positive Laws: A Legislative or Adjudicative Issue?, 55 Rev.
of Politics 5, 22 (1993) ("IT]here is nothing contradictory in arguing, on the one hand, for
a natural law basis of government, and indeed of positive law itself, while at the same
time holding that judges ought, whenever possible, to be bound by written law.").
13. See note 16 and accompanying text. The debate has even inspired a satire. See
Mark Hamilton Levison and Charles Sherman Kramer, The Bill of Rights as Adjunct to
Natural Law, 1991 Detroit Coll. L. Rev. 1267 (neither Hamilton nor Sherman are their
middle names).
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In my view, this discussion has now reached a critical junc-
ture. It has been established beyond any reasonable doubt that
adjudication based on natural rights (as distinct from natural
law14) is excluded neither by "textualist" nor by "originalist" ap-
proaches to constitution interpretation. The labored textual and
historical arguments that have been presented to the contraryls
can be persuasive only to those who have not been exposed to
the competing interpretations based, in part, on evidence omitted
by the skeptics.16
Still, the fact that adjudication based on natural rights is not
refuted by text or history does not mean that it is therefore con-
stitutionally justified. The time has come, therefore, to lay these
important historical and textual debates to one side and face
squarely the two questions posed by Suzanna Sherry at the con-
clusion of her most recent contribution and with which I began
this essay:17 is it possible today to include natural rights in the
process of constitutional adjudication and is it desirable? In
short, it's time to get normative.
14. More on this distinction anon.
15. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Natural Law and Judicial Review: Reflections of an
Earthbound Lawyer, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 5 (1992); Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights,
Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 Yale LJ. 907 (1993); Thomas B. McAffee,
The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1215 (1990); Thomas
B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights "Retained" by the
People, 16 S.I.U. LJ. 267 (1992); Thomas B. McAffee, Prolegomena to a Meaningful De-
bate of the "Unwritten Constitution" Thesis, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 107 (1992); Helen K.
Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders
Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 421
(1991). As this article goes to press Raoul Berger has weighed in with yet another article
criticizing my previous arguments that the Ninth Amendment supports the judicial pro-
tection of the natural rights "retained by the people." See Raoul Berger, The Ninth
Amendment as Perceived by Randy Barnett, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1508 (1994). Responding
to his arguments here would be inappropriate, however, since I intend to put the histori-
cal issues that he discusses to one side for now so I may consider the normative question
of how the Ninth Amendment and the Constitution generally ought to be interpreted.
16. See, e.g., Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth Amendment, in Barnett,
ed., 2 The Rights Retained by the People at I (cited in note 6); Steven J. Heyman, Natural
Rights, Positivism and the Ninth Amendment A Response to McAffee, 16 S.I.U. LJ. 327
(1992); Calvin R. Massey, The Natural Law Component of the Ninth Amendment, 61 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 49 (1992); David N. Mayer, The Natural Rights Basis of the Ninth Amend-
ment" A Reply to Professor McAffee, 16 S.I.U. Li. 313 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, The Foun-
ders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127 (1987); Sherry, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev.
171 (cited in note 1); Bruce N. Morton, John Locke, Robert Bork, Natural Rights and the
Interpretation of the Constitution, 22 Seton Hall L. Rev. 709 (1992). To date, I have not
specifically responded to the subtle and intriguing historical analysis recently presented
by Philip Hamburger. See Hamburger, 102 Yale LJ. 907 (cited in note 15). In what
follows I briefly touch upon them twice. See notes 34 and 71. However, as with Raoul
Berger, most of Hamburger's historical claims are outside the scope of this article.
17. See note 1 and accompanying text.
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Professor Sherry's questions can be viewed as posing two
distinct challenges. The first-"Can we take natural fights into
account today?"-might be considered pragmatic or practical;
the second-"Do we want to?"-might be viewed as more
purely normative. I think this possible distinction is overdrawn.
If we could not take fights into account, we surely would not
want to. And the alleged reasons why we cannot are largely nor-
mative, not really practical in nature. Moreover, many would
concede that we would naturally want to take natural fights into
account if we could. At any rate, I intend to address both ques-
tions here. In this paper, I shall maintain that the correct an-
swers to Suzanna Sherry's questions are "yes" and "yes."
Constitutional adjudication both can and should take natural
fights into account.
My argument can be summarized as follows:
(1) Those who enact laws to govern the conduct of citizenslS
claim that (a) their laws are not unjust and (b) citizens
have at least a prima facia moral duty to obey these laws.
(2) To assess whether these claims of lawmakers are war-
ranted, it is appropriate to ask whether their enactments
have the qualities that are requisite to being both just and
binding.
(3) One of these qualities is that laws not infringe the back-
ground or natural rights retained by the people.
(4) Because citizens cannot assess every law to see if it has
this rights-respecting quality, there must be some proce-
dural assurance that someone sufficiently impartial has at-
tempted such an assessment.
(5) To be legitimate, law-making processes established by a
constitution must (among other things) provide such an
assurance.
(6) In our constitutional scheme, the responsibility for provid-
ing this sort of scrutiny of enacted legislation falls to the
judiciary.
(7) Therefore, background or natural rights should figure in
judicial review of legislation.
(8) However, there are methods for performing this task that
do not require judges to specify all the background or nat-
ural rights retained by the people.
Each step of this argument is contestable, and I shall not be
able to establish all of them in this essay. My main purpose is to
introduce the argument and defend its cogency.
18. I include in the term "citizens" all persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of
constitutional authorities.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY
Getting normative requires a point of entry. We need to ex-
pose the largely hidden problem that normative analysis is in-
tended to address. In the case of a normative analysis of the
Constitution, a document that has achieved near mystical status
in the United States, this question is almost taboo. It is a ques-
tion based on an undisputed fact: the constitution is simply a
piece of "parchment under glass." The question is: why should
we or anyone else care about what it says? The need to answer
this question is what I shall call here the problem of legitimacy.
"Legitimacy" can have many different meanings, so it is im-
portant for me to clarify how I am using this term. By "legiti-
macy," I do not mean the question of whether a particular law is
"valid" because it was enacted according to the accepted legal
process-e.g. the Constitution specifies that to be valid a law
must be enacted by majorities of both houses of Congress and
signed by the President-though some may use the term in this
way. Nor do I equate the legitimacy of a law with its "justice,"
though these two concepts are closely related, or with the mere
perception that a law is just. Rather, the concept of legitimacy
that I am employing refers to whether the process by which a law
is determined to be valid is such as to warrant that the law is just.
That is, was a particular law made in such a manner as to provide
some assurance that it is just? A law produced by such justice-
assuring procedures is legitimate.
Thus, according to my usage, a valid law could be illegiti-
mate;19 and a legitimate law could be unjust.20 Nonetheless, the
problem of legitimacy that I raise here links the process that de-
termines legal validity in a particular legal system to the issue of
justice. Although a constitutional process by which legal validity
is determined need not (as a conceptual matter) take justice into
account, legitimacy suggests that (as a normative matter) it ought
to do so.2 1 For, as I shall explain in the balance of this paper, the
19. A law may be "valid" because produced in accordance to all procedures re-
quired by a particular lawmaking system, but be "illegitimate" because these procedures
are inadequate to provide assurances that a law is just.
20. A law might be "legitimate" because produced according to procedures that as-
sure that it is just, and yet be "unjust" because in this case the procedures (which can
never be perfect) have failed.
21- To the extent the issue is thought to be conceptual as opposed to normative, the
traditional natural law-positivist debate is sterile. Even Aquinas was quite capable of
distinguishing as a conceptual matter between those human laws that were just and those
that were unjust when he declared that ". . . Laws framed by man are either just or
unjust." Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in 20 Great Books of the Western World
233 (The Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952). Rather, for Aquinas and other natural law
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problem of legitimacy is to establish why anyone should care
what a constitutionally valid law may command. The answer I
shall give is that we should care and, consequently, may owe a
prima facie duty to obey a law, only if the processes used to enact
provide good reasons to think that it is just.
II. THE FUNCTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ENTERPRISE
So why should anyone care about what is written on one
particular document that lies under glass in Washington, D.C.?
One reason-and the reason I shall focus on in this paper-is
that the terms of this document are used to regulate an enterprise
that will have a direct effect on those who live in the territory
known as the United States of America.22 In particular, this doc-
ument is used to regulate an enterprise which produces com-
mands that others act or refrain from acting in a particular way.
Certain human beings referring to themselves as members of a
"duly constituted government" are going to be telling you and
me what to do. Drive on the right side of the road. Don't kill or
rape anyone. Pay a percentage of your income in "taxes." Don't
smoke marijuana or inhale cocaine.
Most important, these persons not only threaten to sanction
us in some way for disobedience, but they also claim that (a) they
are justified in imposing sanctions coercively upon us and (b) we
have a moral duty to obey their "lawful" commands-that we
would be acting wrongly by breaking the commands they call
"laws." In sum, they claim right as well as might and rest this
claim in important part on the fact that they are authorized to
issue commands by a piece of parchment they call the "Constitu-
tion." So we are entitled to ask, what (if anything) it is about this
paper that gives their commands the binding authority they
claim?
Look at the matter another way. The Constitution is sup-
posed to be the guiding blueprint for just another human enter-
thinkers, the issue of lawfulness is not conceptual as it is for modem positivists, but nor-
mative. Only just laws "have the power of binding in cosciene... ." Id. It is this issue
of "binding in conscience" that informs his endorsement of Augustine's statement that
"'that which is not just seem to be no law at all;' therefore the force of a law depends on
the extent of its justice." Id. at 227 (emphasis added).
22. 'That, at least, is the theory. The normative argument presented here rests in the
assumption that the enterprise of lawmaking is really governed by the provisions of the
Constitution. To the extent that significant provisions of the Constitution have been
either ignored or interpreted out of existence, this assumption and the normative argu-
ment that rests upon it is undermined.
1995]
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prise that is producing a good or service for human consumption.
In this case the product is law. But unlike other enterprises, this
one purports to have the rightful or justified power to force those
within its jurisdiction to consume its services, to obey its laws.
What (if anything) exactly gives this enterprise this justified
power? Normativity has now entered the picture, not because I
have introduced it, but because those who claim the Constitution
as their "authority" for their actions also claim the justified
power to coerce others to accept their commands. It is then per-
fectly appropriate to ask whether this normative claim is war-
ranted or not. And this is, of course, a normative inquiry.
For example, when A.T.F. agents in military-style uniforms
and armed with genuine automatic assault weapons23 invaded the
property of the Branch Davidians in Waco they implicitly made a
normative claim that they were acting in a justified manner. It
was their claim to be exercising a justified power, as opposed to
anyone's decision to write an article about this claim, that gave
rise to the need to address the normative question of legitimacy.
That their acts may have been authorized by the Constitution
does not settle the problem of legitimacy, it raises it. For the
problem of legitimacy that I am discussing here applies to the
Constitution itself.24
But the normative inquiry does not end there. For those
who claim to be empowered by the Constitution make a further
claim as well. They claim that you and I are morally obliged (at
least prima facie) to obey their commands. It is claimed (and
commonly thought) that David Koresh and his followers were
not only legally obliged to lay down their weapons in the face of
these "agents" of the "duly constituted authority" acting "under
color of law." They were morally obliged as well. Their failure
to obey is claimed to have been wrongful as well as illegal. Had
these invaders been anyone other than the "public officials" they
23. As distinct from the semi-automatic so-called "assault weapons" recently pro-
hibited by the Congress.
24. To see why authority by itself is not enough, suppose that you are my agent and I
authorize you to take someone's car by force if needed. When the car owner resists, you
tell her that I have authorized you to take the car, which is true. She may then appropri-
ately ask what gives me the right or power to authorize such a thing. Why should she care
what I have or have not authorized? In addition to showing that your acts were author-
ized, you must also show that either you or I had the justified power to take the car by
force and that she had a duty to refrain from interfering. The A.T.F. agents' attempt to
justify their conduct solely by appealing to the authority of the Constitution is like appeal-
ing to the authority that I granted my agent. It leaves out the normative dimension of the
claim being made. Of course, had their actions been unauthorized, then the problem of
legitimacy raised by the Constitution would not be implicated. They would have been
acting illegally as well as, perhaps, unjustly.
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called themselves, the residents of the compound would surely
have been justified in defending themselves against such heavily
armed marauders. But solely by virtue of the A.T.F. agents'
claim of legal authority, the normative conclusion is said to be
completely reversed. Now those who might otherwise have been
viewed as defending themselves from aggression are considered
murderers rather than innocent victims of a potentially deadly
assault (or would be if they had survived the final conflagration).
So the existence of the parchment under glass we call the
Constitution raises a two-fold normative problem: what (if any-
thing) gives the persons who claim the authority of its organiza-
tional scheme the justified power to issue commands to the rest
of us? And what (if anything) creates in the rest of us a moral
duty to obey these commands? Perhaps these are two aspects of
the same question. No matter. The fact is that these questions
are not ordinarily addressed because most people simply assume
that both the command-issuing power and the moral duty of obe-
dience exists, and so they are not much interested in why. Why
struggle with a question to which one already knows the
answer?25
Still, the normative question is not so easily avoided. As
Steve Macedo has observed, "[a]t the most basic level, moral
principles play an inescapable role in constitutional interpreta-
tion, and that is because the choice of an interpretive strategy,
indeed, the very question of how we ought to construe the mean-
ing of "law," are themselves moral questions."26 In other words,
whether one is an "originalist," a "textualist," or an adherent to
the "living constitution" school of constitutional interpretation
depends on at least an implicit answer to the problem of legiti-
macy. Originalists, textualists, et al. are implicitly making some
sort of claim about the origin of constitutional legitimacy and the
individual's duty of obedience. Normativity cannot be avoided
because it is omnipresent. You cannot engage in discourse about
the Constitution and its proper interpretation without making
implicit claims about legitimacy.
I suggest that to address the question of legitimacy of the
Constitution, we must begin by asking the point or function of
25. Although most constitutional scholars ignore this question, at least one philoso-
pher has both considered the problem and addressed it in much the same way as I advo-
cate here. See Jeffrey Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of
Legitimacy, in Alan S. Rosenbaum, ed., Constitutionalism: The Philosophical Dimension
127 (Greenwood Press, 1988).
26. Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution: Toward a Synthesis for "Earth-
bound" Interpreters, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 29, 30 (1992).
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the enterprise it regulates.27 Of course, the enterprise may very
well have many more than one point but I shall focus on one
particular function that I think even the most minimal of statists
would concede to be central and which directly grows out of the
previous discussion: it is an enterprise that is supposed to pro-
duce commands that create in the citizenry a moral duty of
obedience.28
Some philosophers of law might rightly deny that the com-
mands issued by the duly constituted authority necessarily create
a duty of obedience. Robin West, for example, has argued that,
"if we wish to make our laws just, we must first see that many of
our laws are unjust, and if we are to understand that simple truth,
we must understand that the legality of those norms implies noth-
ing about their justice."29 Taken as a conceptual claim, I entirely
agree with this statement, although I think it is highly misleading.
True, many of our laws are unjust. And it is also true that the
legality simpliciter of those norms tells us nothing about their jus-
tice. If both of these claims are true, then it is further true that
the mere fact that an edict is legal tells us nothing about whether
there is moral duty to obey its dictates.30
But despite its validity, this syllogism is deeply problematic.
For it elides the fact that people almost uniformly believe that
because a norm is legal, it creates at least a prima facie duty of
obedience. So, to return to the example of Waco, most people
(outside of Texas) condemned the Branch Davidians without
ever asking exactly which legal "norm" it was that they had alleg-
edly violated. Nor was there any interest in asking whether the
Branch Davidians were actually guilty of violating whatever rule
was being enforced. These questions were not asked because for
most people the mere fact that a legal norm was being enforced
by the duly-constituted authorities was enough for them to con-
clude that the Branch Davidians had a moral duty to comply with
the orders of the A.T.F.
27. Cf. Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of Legitimacy at 132
(cited in note 25) ("[I]t is not possible to choose... [the appropriate method of constitu-
tional interpretation] without having some theory of what the Constitution is, what its
point is, what its source of obligatoriness is, and so on.") (emphasis in the original).
28. See id. at 133 ("Legitimate power means (at least) power with which we are
morally obliged to comply.").
29. Robin West, Natural Law Ambiguities, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 831, 831 (1992) (em-
phasis in original).
30. It is possible to argue that people also have a moral duty to obey unjust laws for
reasons of, say, the need to maintain social order. Indeed, Aquinas himself so argued in
the passage immediately following that quoted in note 21. Although I do not reject such
a claim, it is, needless to say, in need of substantial elaboration and defense.
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Professor West might respond that this is the very problem
she is addressing. People should be far more skeptical about the
legitimacy of legal norms, she might well argue, and only by in-
sisting on the strict separation of law and morals are we likely to
induce this sort of skepticism. While I agree that people should
be far more skeptical than they are, I reject a radical schism be-
tween law and morals as the most efficacious path to this mind
set. And I am not sure that complete skepticism is what Profes-
sor West desires. Do we want every citizen to evaluate entirely
independently every law to assess its justice? Maybe we do. Do
we want every citizen to obey only those laws which he or she
concludes is just? Probably not. Perhaps this is why most people
go with the legal flow and condemn the lawbreaker without
themselves scrutinizing the law that was violated.
If, however, we want people to feel obliged to adhere even
to some laws the justice of which they may doubt, then it cannot
be the case that "the legality of those norms implies nothing
about their justice." Or perhaps more accurately, although in
some legal systems this statement may be completely accurate,
we cannot be satisfied with such a value-neutral process of legal-
ity in a society in which "law" is such a value-laden term. For
unless we demand a process in which the legality of a norm does
imply something about its justice we will have failed to achieve
the objective of having a system of norm creation, dissemination,
and enforcement that does create a prima facie moral duty of
obedience in the citizenry-where, in short, the widespread per-
ception of legitimacy is warranted. And lawmakers in a society
that believes that legal norms are binding in conscience will get a
powerful "benefit of the doubt" or "halo-effect" to which they
are not entitled.
To avoid confusion, it is important to stress once again that,
while the term law is so value-laden because people generally
believe that validly enacted laws bind in conscience, the concep-
tion of legitimacy I am employing is not to be equated with the
public's belief or perception that enactments claimed to be laws
are likely to be just. Instead, I am taking this belief as given and
asking whether this perception is warranted given the constitu-
tional processes that produced the enactment, just as we might
ask whether the public's belief or perception that a particular law
is valid is warranted or not. Is the lawmaking process such as to
warrant a belief that it is likely to be delivering what it is promis-
ing to deliver: laws that bind in conscience? Thus the concept of
legitimacy is not to be confused with the perception of legitimacy.
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The public's perception of legitimacy may very well be wrong.
Ensuring that it is correct is the problem of legitimacy at issue
here.
We can reach this same conclusion from a somewhat differ-
ent direction by distinguishing between "producers" and "con-
sumers" of legal commands. In our (and I would contend every)
legal culture, those who produce laws implicitly claim that citi-
zens have a duty to obey lawful commands. And in most cul-
tures, the consumers of the product of the legal system accept
this claim of the producers. To the extent that this claim is both
made and accepted, there is then an implied warranty of
merchantability that accompanies every lawful command. Just as
the grocer selling sausages implicitly warrants that the sausages
are wholesome and fit for human consumption,31 the purveyors
of lawful commands implicitly warrant that their commands are
just (or, at a minimum, are not unjust3z), and these commands,
by virtue of their justice, create in the citizen a duty of obedience.
This implied warranty of merchantability could be dis-
claimed by, for example, explicitly stating that there is no moral
obligation to obey a particular enactment. The fact that this dis-
claimer is never issued, however, conveys to the public the intent
to warranty the merchantability of lawful commands. It may be
true, as Otto von Bismarck is reported to have said, that it is
better not to know how either sausages or laws are made. If,
however, we are to eat the one and obey the other then someone
better inquire as to the adequacy of the respective production
processes. If each consumer has a moral duty to obey lawful
commands without questioning each and every one (as people
generally believe and as lawmakers want them to believe), then
those who produce the laws and who implicitly warrant their
merchantability have a corresponding duty to put in place ade-
quate quality-control mechanisms to ensure the wholesome of
the commands they purvey.33
31. See U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (American Law Institute, 1990):
Unless excluded or modified.. ., a warranty that the goods shall be merchanta-
ble is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to
goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to
be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
32. I have in mind the many laws that are entirely conventional in nature, such as
traffic regulations, and not in themselves requirements of justice. Such laws are conven-
tional in the sense that, although there may be many different ways to accomplish a par-
ticular end, some way must authoritatively be settled upon. Still, it is appropriate to ask
of any particular convention whether it is unjust.
33. Cf. Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of Legitimacy at 131
(cited in note 25): "[L]egitimate government is not simply one that keeps to a pre-estab-
lished recipe for legitimacy but one that has built into it an institutional mechanism for
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This part of my analysis can be summarized as follows: If
lawmakers claim that people have a prima facie moral duty to
obey legal norms, and if it is desirable that people accord laws a
presumption of legitimacy (albeit within limits), then the system
which produces these legal norms must have the requisite institu-
tional quality to justify this presumption. To promulgate enact-
ments without taking steps to ensure their justice and calling
these enactments "laws" knowing that orders so labeled benefit
from the presumption of legitimacy, is to promise one thing while
delivering another. It is, in short, constitutional bait-and-switch.
If the term "lawful" or "law" is to carry the normative implica-
tion that there is a moral duty to obey, then the requisite binding
quality must go in before the name "law" goes on.
III. NATURAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
My principal objective in this article is to advance the argu-
ment of the preceding Part-that for constitutional processes to
be legitimate, they must include procedures to assure that lawful
commands are justified and of such a nature as to bind in con-
science. In this Part, I suggest what quality enactments must
have to bind in conscience and how this quality should influence
our interpretation of the Constitution. Here I share the framers'
belief that enactments should not violate the inherent or natural
rights of those to whom it is directed. That this was their belief-
and that this belief is reflected in the words of the Ninth Amend-
ment-is conceded even by those who would contest the appro-
priateness of judicial intervention to ensure that laws have this
rights-respecting quality.34 In addition, I contend that an assur-
ance that a law has not infringed the enumerated and unenumer-
continually reflecting on the conditions of its legitimacy and for effectively translating the
results of that reflection into law."
34. For example, Thomas McAffee, Philip Hamburger, and Michael McConnell all
agree that the framers were very much concerned with natural rights. See, e.g., McAffee,
61 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 119 n.41 (cited in note 15) ([T]here is reason to think that the
founders sought to establish a fairly particular vision of natural law and natural rights
rather then an open-ended methodology in which subsequent decision-makers would feel
free to reject their decisions as to the basic content of natural rights."); Hamburger, 102
Yale Li. at 915 (cited in note 15) ("[L]arge numbers of Americans spoke about govern-
ment, liberty and constitutional law on the basis of some shared assumptions about natu-
ral rights and the state of nature."); Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of
Constitutional Democracy, 64 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 89, 99 (1989) ("The founders of the
United States were believers in natural right .... The Constitution was framed in accord-
ance with the people's understanding of natural right; we know this from the preamble's
statement of intentions."). Rather, these writers question whether the founders contem-
plated or intended the legal enforceability or judicial protection of these rights.
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ated rights retained by the people is a necessary (though perhaps
not a sufficient) condition of the legitimacy of the lawmaking
process.
What are these natural rights and why does legitimacy re-
quire that they be respected? Elsewhere, speaking not for the
framers but for myself, I have offered the following definition:
natural rights are the set of concepts that
define the moral space within which persons must be free to
make their own choices and live their own lives. They are
rights insofar as they entail enforceable claims on other per-
sons (including those who call themselves "government offi-
cials"). And they are natural insofar as their necessity
depends upon the (contingent) nature of persons and the so-
cial and physical world in which persons reside.35
In sum, "the pre-existent rights of nature," in Madison's words,
are those rights that "are essential to secure the liberty of the
people."36 A respect for these rights is as essential to enabling
diverse persons to pursue happiness while living in society with
others as a respect for fundamental principles of engineering is
essential to building a bridge to span a chasm.37
35. Randy E. Barnett, The Intersection of Natural Rights and Positive Constitutional
Law, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 853, 862 (1993).
36. J. Gales and W. Seaton, eds., 1 The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of
the United States 454 (1834) (statement of James Madison) (emphasis added). In the pas-
sage from which these phrases are taken, Madison is arguing that the right of trial by jury
enumerated in the proposed amendments, though a "positive right," is as essential to
secure the liberty of the people as any natural right.
37. Although I do not claim that all Americans in the founding generation shared
this (or any) conception of natural rights, it is clear that some did. For example, Pastor
Elizur Goodrich (1734-1797) made a functional argument of this sort in an "election ser-
mon" he delivered to the governor and general assembly of Connecticut on the eve of the
Constitutional Convention:
The principles of society are the laws, which Almighty God has established
in the moral world, and made necessary to be observed by mankind; in order to
promote their true happiness, in their transactions and intercourse. These laws
may be considered as principles, in respect of their fixedness and operation; and
as maxims, since by the knowledge of them, we discover these rules of conduct,
which direct mankind to the highest perfection, and supreme happiness of their
nature. They are as fixed and unchangeable as the laws which operate in the
natural world.
Human art in order to produce certain effects, must conform to the princi-
ples and laws, which the Almighty Creator has established in the natural world.
He who neglects the cultivation of his field, and the proper time of sowing, may
not expect a harvest. He, who would assist mankind in raising weights, and
overcoming obstacles, depends on certain rules, derived from the knowledge of
mechanical principles applied to the construction of machines, in order to give
the most useful effect to the smallest force: And every builder should well un-
derstand the best position of firmness and strength, when he is about to erect an
edifice. For he, who attempts these things, on other principles, than those of na-
ture, attempts to make a new world and his aim will prove absurd and his labour
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Natural rights must be distinguished from "natural law" (or
what some refer to as natural right38). Each of these concepts
addresses different problems. Natural law or right is a method of
assessing the legitimacy of individual conduct. This method is
used to stipulate, for example, that persons should live their lives
in certain ways and not in others.39 The concept of natural rights,
in contrast, while sharing a common intellectual ancestry and
lost. No more can mankind be conducted to happiness; or civil societies united,
and enjoy peace and prosperity, without observing the moral principles and con-
nections, which the Almighty Creator has established for the government of the
moral world.
Elizur Goodrich, The Principles of Civil Union and Happiness Considered and Recom-
mended, in Ellis Sandoz, ed., Political Sermons of the American Founding: 1730-1805 914-
15 (Liberty Press, 1991) (emphasis added).
Lest this quote reinforce a modem misconception about traditional natural rights
theory, note that although Goodrich identifies God as the original source of the laws that
govern in the moral world, so too does he identify God as the source of the laws that
govern agriculture and engineering. With both types of principles and laws, once estab-
lished by a divine power they become part of the world in which we find ourselves and are
discovered by human reason. Thus, today one can no more disparage natural rights be-
cause Eighteenth Century thinkers attributed their origin to a divine power than one can
disparage the laws of physics because Eighteenth Century scientists believed that such
laws were also established by God. Whatever the source of these moral laws, Goodrich's
argument is that they must be respected if we are to achieve the end of happiness, peace,
and prosperity. This view of moral laws assumes, of course, that happiness, peace, and
prosperity are appropriate ends. Should anyone question this assumption, additional ar-
guments will need to be presented.
38. See, e.g., McConnell, 64 Chi. Kent L. Rev. at 89 (cited in note 34) (consistently
referring to natural right as opposed to natural rights). But cf. Masugi, 9 Pol. Communi-
cation at 245 n.5 (cited in note 10) ("In accordance with the rough practice of the Ameri-
can Founders, I use natural rights and natural law interchangeably. Natural right is the
more comprehensive term."). Although I agree that the founders were far from uniform
in their usage, the political writings I have read seem almost invariably to use the lan-
guage of natural rights as opposed either to natural law or natural right. See, e.g., Roger
Sherman's Draft of the Bill of Rights, in 1 Randy E. Barnett, ed., The Rights Retained by
the People: The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment 1 (George Mason U. Press,
1989) ("The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they
enter into Society....."); Madison's Notes for Amendments Speech, 1789, in id. at 64
("Contents of Bill of Rhts.... 3. natural rights retained as speach [sic]."). Indeed, use by
the founders of the term natural right would have been quite aberrational.
More importantly, Masugi's use of natural right as the more comprehensive term
elides the appropriate distinction between the two modes of thought. It also seems to be
at odds with the usage of contemporary writers who systematically prefer the term natural
right to natural rights and in contexts that suggest that they really mean natural law.
Russell Hittenger, for example, uses the term in the context of natural law, as opposed to
natural rights, and attributes it to Aquinas. See Hittenger, 55 Rev. of Politics at 5 (cited in
note 12) (referring to "the only article of the Summa exclusively devoted to the issue of
natural right (ius naturale)"). In sum, the recent tendency to supplant the term natural
rights with that of natural right has only compounded the normal academic confusion of
the concept of natural law with that of natural rights. This terminological development
seems to be associated with scholars who have been influenced by the writings of Leo
Strauss.
39. See, e.g., Henry B. Veatch, For an Ontology of Morals: A Critique of Contempo-
rary Ethical Theory (Northwestern U. Press, 1971).
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methodology with natural law, addresses a quite different prob-
lem. It asks, not what the good life is for each person and how
each person should act, but what moral "space" or "jurisdiction"
each person requires in order to pursue the good life in society
with others.
In sum, whereas natural law assesses the propriety or ethics
of individual conduct, natural rights assesses the propriety or jus-
tice of restrictions imposed on individual conduct.40 Of course,
the same conduct-murder, for example-might be thought to
violate natural law because it is "bad" (persons should not kill
others except in self-defense), and because it is unjust (persons
have a right not to be killed except in self-defense). But the rea-
sons why actions are bad are not always the same as why they are
unjust, and it has long been recognized that many actions that are
bad are not unjust, in the sense that they violate the rights of
others.41 And on rare occasion, it may not be bad to act un-
justly-as for example when, in an emergency, one takes prop-
erty that rightfully belongs to another to save one's life.
Contrary to the claims of critics of liberalism, then, natural
rights are not conceived of as "presocial";42 nor do they assume
"atomistic" individuals. Rather, the term natural rights refers to
those rights that are inescapably needed precisely to protect indi-
viduals and associations from the power of others-including the
power of the stronger, of groups, and of the State-when and
only when persons are deeply enmeshed in a social context. Such
rights would be entirely unnecessary if individuals were not in
society with each other, or if the actions of some persons did not
adversely affect the welfare of others. Moreover, a constitutional
commitment to protecting natural rights (as opposed to enacting
natural law) does not entail any general mandate to legislate mo-
40. I do not claim that everyone, or even most people, use all these terms in pre-
cisely this way. I claim only that natural law thinking is distinguishable from natural
rights thinking and that this terminology best describes the difference between them.
Moreover, running these two modes of thought together leads to serious confusion.
41. For example, natural law theorist Thomas Aquinas, writing centuries before nat-
ural rights developed as a separate methodology, argued:
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of
which are not perfect in virtue. Therefore human laws do not forbid all vices,
from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it
is possible for the majority to abstain, and chiefly those that are to the hurt of
others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained;
thus human law prohibits murder, theft and the like.
Aquinas, Summa Theologica at 232 (cited in note 21) (emphasis added).
42. These rights are, however, conceived of analytically as pre-governmental. Per-
haps the charge that liberals conceive of rights as presocial is persistent because some
critics of liberalism are so committed to statism that they equate government with society.
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rality. Rather than imposing moral duties on persons to live their
lives in certain ways, natural rights protect persons from the State
and from each other.43
Both the claim that such background rights are necessary
and their exact contours are, of course, contestable and con-
tested44 and I shall not argue the matter here.45 That the found-
ing generation believed in their necessity is without question,
however, and that they viewed their protection as the highest end
of the Constitution is also generally conceded. Nonetheless, the
relevance of this belief is open to question. Perhaps, as some
have argued, the framers of the Constitution did not believe that
such rights merited judicial protection unless they were expressly
included in the constitutional text. I have attempted to answer
this question elsewhere46 and this is not the place to rehearse my
arguments and those of others who take the same position,47 nor
the arguments of our worthy opponents. 48 To date this has been
one of the most hotly debated issues surrounding the Ninth
Amendment.
43. For this reason, the constitutional protection of these rights may include both a
"negative" duty of government to refrain from infringing these rights and a "positive"
duty upon government to protect the rights of its citizens from infringement by others.
See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government Protection, Liberty and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 41 Duke LJ. 507, 510 (1991) ("[T]he classical conception of liberty
was not merely negative, but had a crucial positive dimension-the protection of individ-
ual rights under law."). Of course, to claim that a constitution imposes positive duties on
government is not to concede that it imposes positive duties on the citizenry. In the main,
the Constitution "constitutes" the government of the United States and regulates its pow-
ers; it does not purport to regulate the rights of the people.
44. Some eschew the term natural rights because of metaphysical claims they associ-
ate with it; they prefer instead the term "moral right" or "human right." Adopting this
terminology does not affect the analysis presented here, provided that (1) a moral right is
considered to be an enforceable claim, or what the classical natural rights theories called a
"perfect" right as opposed to "imperfect" moral rights which are unenforceable; and (2) a
moral right is not the equivalent of a legal right, but is a concept used to evaluate the
justice of legal rights.
45. I have provided the beginnings of a functional account of the core rights tradi-
tionally recognized by liberalism-several property and freedom of contract-in Randy
E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. Phil. &
Policy 62 (1992). There I argue that these concepts are essential because they address the
pervasive social problems of knowledge, interest, and power.
46. See Randy E. Barnett, Introduction" Implementing the Ninth Amendment in Bar-
nett, ed., 2 Rights Retained by the People at 1 (cited in note 6); and Randy E. Barnett,
Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 Corn. L. Rev. 1 (1988). A revised version of this
article appears as Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in Barnett, ed., 1
Rights Retained by the People at 1 (cited in note 38).
47. See, e.g., Heyman, 16 S.I.U. LJ. 327 (cited in note 16); Massey, 61 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 49 (cited in note 16); Mayer, 16 S.I.U. LJ. 313 (cited in note 16); Morton, 22 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 709 (cited in note 16); Sherry, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 171 (cited in note 1);
Sherry, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127 (cited in note 16).
48. See the authors cited supra note 15.
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Instead, I wish to use the preceding analysis of legitimacy to
address a question that has long surrounded any discussion of the
framers' intent: Assuming that the founding generation did be-
lieve that legislation that violated natural rights was beyond the
powers of government and therefore void, why are we who are
alive today bound by their beliefs, particularly if we now reject
the concept of natural rights as outmoded and even
incomprehensible?
According to the approach presented here we, as citizens,
are not bound by the framer's intentions. Rather, I am claiming
(a) that the framers wrote a constitution, the text of which some
persons alive today purport to be governed by when they issue
supposedly binding commands to us; (b) that we are bound in
conscience to obey these commands only if the lawmaking
processes established and regulated by this text provide assur-
ance that our rights have not been violated; (c) that if the Consti-
tution provides effective protection of rights, then the lawful
commands of constitutional authorities may be justified and
binding and, if not, then we obey solely to avoid punishment.
For these reasons, the fact that the text of the Constitution
includes the words, "[t]he enumeration in this Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people,"49 is significant. For the Ninth Amend-
ment, along with the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth,s0 supports the view that, as a descriptive matter, the
assessment of constitutional validity-by the judiciary or anyone
else-established by the text of the Constitution did (and until it
is amended still does) include a constitutional solicitude for natu-
ral rights. And if this interpretation or description of the text is
accepted as correct, then the Constitution may, as a normative
matter, be legitimate. If it is incorrect, then the legitimacy of the
Constitution is called into question.
It is, then, necessary to take a stand one way or the other as
to the best interpretation of the Ninth Amendment and the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, just as it necessary to take a stand on
the best interpretation of the First Amendment, the Necessary
and Proper Clause, and all other relevant portions of the Consti-
tution. It is simply inadequate to point to the disagreements that
exist and then blithely ignore the Constitution on the grounds
49. U.S. Const. Amend. IX.
50. See U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 2 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States....").
Obviously the framers of this amendment were able, along with Aquinas, to distinguish
conceptually between a validly enacted and a binding and enforceable "law."
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that competing interpretations have been offered. A proper in-
terpretation of the Constitution as a whole requires a proper in-
terpretation of these passages as well as all the others. There is
no escape, therefore, for anyone interpreting the Constitution-
whether the interpreter be a judge or a law professor-to con-
front the conflicting arguments and evidence and decide which is
the most convincing interpretation of the rights "retained by the
people" and the Constitution's injunction that they be neither
denied no disparaged.
To put the matter starkly, those who argue, first, that the
framers intentions matter when interpreting the Constitution
and, second, that the framers did not intend that all branches of
government strive to protect the unenumerated rights retained
by the people, should hope that they are wrong on at least one
count. For, if they are correct both that courts are bound by the
original meaning of the constitutional text and that this text does
not provide any protection of unenumerated rights, then they
may have won the constitutional battle, yet lost the legitimacy
war. They would have succeeded only in proving that the consti-
tution now in effect does not provide what it must provide to
make laws that are justified and bind in conscience. For if those
who produce and inspect legislation are not bound to respect the
rights retained by the people, then the people are not bound to
respect their laws.
Fortunately, they are wrong. The argument that the Consti-
tution as amended established a regime of democratic majoritari-
anism fettered only by those rights which were enumerated is
belied by both its text and history-not to mention a goodly part
of our constitutional jurisprudence. That we should resolve our
historical and textual doubts in favor of protecting unenumerated
rights is bolstered by the moral argument that even democratic
majorities must justify their forcible impositions on minorities.
As Jeffrey Reiman has argued,
there is nothing inherently legitimating about the electoral
process. If anything, the electoral process is the problem, not
the solution.... [T]he policies that emerge from the electoral
process will be imposed on the dissenting minority against its
wishes. And then, rather than answering the question of legit-
imacy, this will raise the question with respect to those dissent-
ers. Why are the exercises of power approved by the majority
against the wishes of (and potentially prohibiting the desired
actions of) the minority obligatory with respect to the minor-
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ity? Why are such exercises of power not simply a matter of
majority tyrannizing the minority?51
Our choice among interpretations as well as interpretive
methods is, then, a normative one. The "best" interpretation of
the U.S. Constitution is one that takes the natural or background
rights of persons into account when evaluating the legitimacy of
any governmental regulation of a person's rightful exercise of his
or her liberty. For unless we do, the enterprise which the Consti-
tution establishes and regulates will have failed in its essential
function of providing justified laws that bind in conscience.
One question remains. If we generally believe in a core of
liberty or "retained" rights that is to be protected from govern-
ment intrusion (as the furor over Robert Bork's dismissal of the
Ninth Amendment suggests we do), if this belief is well founded
(as I think it is), and if the constitutional text can fairly be read as
justifying scrutiny of legislation to see if it has infringed these
retained rights (as I think it can), then: Do laws that regulate a
person's conduct within this protected domain bind in conscience
those whose liberty is being regulated? There are two ap-
proaches one can take to this question.
First, one could take the strong libertarian position that such
rights may never be regulated by anyone, including the govern-
ment, and that any enactment that does so is unjust and void.
Although this view may very well be correct as a matter of moral
and political theory, it is not the view embodied in the text of the
Constitution. For if natural rights are to be absolutely protected
from any regulation, then no governmental action would with-
stand scrutiny. If such rights merit absolute protection (as well
they may), this constitution neither promises nor provides such
protection. If that fact deprives the Constitution of all legiti-
macy, then so be it. On the other hand, it may be that legitimacy
is a relative concept, so that the Constitution's less than absolute
protection of natural rights means that it is superior to many al-
ternative political arrangements, but inferior to others.
51. Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of Legitimacy at 134 (cited
in note 25). As he elaborates:
These questions not only point up the error of taking electoral accountabil-
ity as an independent source of legitimacy, they also suggest that it is mistaken
to think of electoral accountability and constitutional provisions as alternative
sources of legitimacy. Rather, the Constitution with its provisions limiting the
majority's ability to exercise power is the answer to the question of why decisions
voted by a majority are binding on the minority who disagree.
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Second, one may take the view that (for better or worse) the
Constitution provides less than absolute protection of the back-
ground natural fights retained by the people. So, for example,
the exercise of such fights may be regulated by the general gov-
ernment if it is exercising a delegated power and if the exercise of
this power is both necessary and proper.5 2 Although according
to this view, the Constitution does contemplate the regulation of
these background fights under these conditions53 the existence
of these rights even when properly regulated remains significant
in two respects: first, the fact that governmental actions restrict
the exercise of a person's fights places the burden of justification
on that branch of government which seeks to act in this way.
Second, the fact that the fights retained by the people are ina-
lienable (as I contend54) means that, even when their regulation
is shown to be authorized, necessary, and proper, persons still
retain their fights and may insist that a particular type of regula-
tion cease when it has ceased to be necessary. In sum, fights do
not evaporate just because they have once been regulated. Only
this second conception of natural fights permits us to reconcile
the protection of the background fights retained by the people,
with the government powers, albeit limited, that the Constitution
acknowledges. 55
IV. TAKING NATURAL RIGHTS INTO ACCOUNT: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
So my answer to the second of Suzanna Sherry's questions is
that we most certainly want to reconcile our natural fights past
with our textualist present. But how? To some extent, I have
suggested my answer to this question as well. I have suggested
52. For a discussion of the distinct meanings originally attached by the founding
generation to the terms "necessary" and "proper," see Gary Lawson and Patricia B.
Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the
Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke W. 267 (1993).
53. As explained below, according to this conception of the Constitution, the regula-
tion of natural rights is to be distinguished from their infringement. A purely libertarian
conception of natural rights might well find that the Constitution also sanctions the latter.
For example, the Sixteenth Amendment permits the taxation of income, and the Fifth
Amendment permits takings of private property for public use when "just compensation"
is made.
54. For several reasons why some rights are inalienable, see Randy E. Barnett, Con-
tract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. Phil. & Policy 179 (1986).
55. See Henry B. Veatch, Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? at 202-208 (La. State U.
Press, 1985) (defending from a natural law perspective a conception of inalienable-
rather than absolute-natural rights that are justified because they afford the necessary
conditions for the living of a good life, and that must be protected by an independent
judiciary lest either the public authorities or the private individual be made a judge in his
own cause.)
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that the existence of inalienable natural rights that exist indepen-
dently of governmental fiat means that those persons who act
"under color of law" have a duty to respect these rights, and to
show that any regulation of them is both necessary and proper.
Having made this showing with respect to a particular enactment
does not cause the right that has been regulated to be lost. The
inalienability of rights means that when an enactment ceases to
be necessary and proper, it no longer binds the conscience of the
citizenry.
This approach is what I have elsewhere referred to as the
"presumptive method"56 of protecting constitutional rights and it
is based on what I have called the "presumption of liberty."57
This presumptive method enables courts to protect natural rights
without them ever having to use the term or compile a compre-
hensive list of these fights. The presumption of liberty can only
be operational, however, if it is enforceable. It is woefully inade-
quate to insist that legislatures or executive branch officials may
be the judge in their own cases when their actions are alleged to
infringe upon the rightful liberty of a citizen. The whole purpose
of natural rights in this context is to protect persons from legisla-
tive or executive abuses. Unless these rights are protected by
relatively "independent tribunals of justice,"58 they are virtually
56. See Barnett, Introduction: Implementing the Ninth Amendment in Barnett, ed., 2
Rights Retained by the People at 10-46 (cited in note 16) (describing and defending the
adoption of a "presumption of liberty"). Elsewhere, I have identified two other methods
of protecting unenumerated rights. See Barnett, 74 Corn. L. Rev. at 30-38 (cited in note
46) (distinguishing between the originalist, constructivist, and presumptive methods of
interpreting unenumerated rights). The "originalist method" seeks to identify the found-
ing generation's conception of natural rights by surveying the same historical materials in
which originalists seek evidence of the original meaning of other constitutional provi-
sions. See e.g., Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale
LJ. 1073,1074-81 (1991) (enumerating the framers' conception of natural rights); Donald
S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 16 S.1.U. L.. 251 (1992) (comparing state
ratification convention proposals and state bills of rights with Madison's proposal to Con-
gress and the enacted Bill of Rights). The "constructivist method" attempts to construct a
theory of the rights retained by the people and then use this theory to ground particular
rights. The Supreme Court's construction of the "right of privacy" from various textual
passages of the Constitution is one way of employing the constructive method. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
57. This and the next three paragraphs summarize the analysis I have presented at
greater length elsewhere, after which I describe some additional features of this approach.
58. The phrase is taken from Madison's speech to the first House of Representatives
in defense of his proposed amendments to the Constitution: "If they are incorporated into
the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar
manner the guardians of these rights .... " 1 The Debates and Proceedings in the Con-
gress of the United States at 457 (cited in note 36) (statement of James Madison), reprinted
in Barnett, ed., 1 Rights Retained by the People at 51 (cited in note 38).
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worthless.59 Of course, if legislatures do take pains to regulate
the rights of citizens only when it is necessary and proper to do
so, we can expect them to be able to justify their actions. Regret-
tably, our experience with legislatures has not been so utopian.
For this reason, meaningful "scrutiny" by an impartial magistrate
of legislative and executive branch actions that impinge upon the
liberty of individuals and associations is required.
According to the current thinking, there can be different de-
grees of scrutiny-so-called rational basis scrutiny, strict scrutiny
and intermediate scrutiny-and there exists a multitude of for-
mulations of each. To the extent that every statute can withstand
rational basis scrutiny and no statute can pass strict scrutiny, this
distinction is disingenuous. To adopt one type of scrutiny is to
eliminate all review; to adopt the other is to eliminate all legisla-
tion affecting any exercise of liberty. I have therefore deliber-
ately chosen the phrase meaningful scrutiny to denote a real
examination of legislation (or executive actions) to determine
whether it is really necessary to restrict liberty in order to accom-
plish a legitimate governmental end, and whether the type of
means chosen to effectuate this end is proper-that is within the
appropriate powers of government. The former question is in-
strumental; the latter may entail an examination of the back-
ground rights of the people.
So, for example, the power to conscript citizens into the mili-
tary is not listed among the enumerated powers of Congress. If
valid, conscription must be justified under the necessary and
proper clause as both necessary and proper to facilitate Con-
gress' power to raise and support an army. Is it really necessary
to conscript citizens into the military to provide a national de-
fense? Is conscription a proper exercise of governmental power?
Similarly, the enumerated congressional power to establish a
post office does not include the power to confer a monopoly on
the Post Office so established.60 Is such a monopoly really neces-
sary for mail service to be provided? Is the grant of monopoly-
which coercively puts competitors out of business-a proper ex-
59. Cf. Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of Legitimacy, at 144
(cited in note 25).
On my view, the Court's decisions must be legally binding precisely because they
are decisions about the conditions of legitimate governance by the other
branches, conditions whose determinations cannot be left up to those branches.
Unless the Court's decisions are legally binding, a necessary condition of legiti-
macy, namely, a built-in mechanism for not only monitoring but effectively cor-
recting the conditions of legitimacy, is lacking.
60. The Articles of Confederation did expressly confer such a power upon Congress.
See Art. of Confederation, Art. IX (1777).
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ercise of governmental power? 61 Meaningful scrutiny does not
presuppose any particular answer to such questions. It simply
means that when a person's rightful liberty is restricted by gov-
ernment, that person may challenge the restriction and, if chal-
lenged, the burden is placed upon the government to justify the
restriction as a necessary and proper regulation of liberty. This is
not to exalt the judiciary, but the citizen. In Charles Black's
words, "[i]f we are committed to anything, it is the idea of 'lib-
erty.' If that commitment doesn't really refer to anything except
a good inner feeling, we ought to shut up about it."62
According to this approach and contrary to the view prevail-
ing today, the power to regulate-i.e., make regular-the exer-
cise of liberty is not the same as the power to prohibit.63 If the
presumption of liberty did nothing other than prevent the com-
plete prohibition of rightful conduct, it would be an important
departure from the current constitutional approach.6 4 Still, no
61. The ratification conventions of four states-Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New York, and North Carolina-formally requested that prohibitions on granting mo-
nopolies be included in the Bill of Rights. See Appendix B: Amendments to the United
States Constitution Proposed by State Ratification Convention, in Barnett, 1 Rights Re-
tained by the People, at 354, 355, 360, 369 (cited in note 38). New York's proposal read:
"That the Congress do not grant monopolies, or erect any company with exclusive advan-
tages of commerce." Id. at 360. In his speech to the House concerning the constitutional-
ity of the first national bank, Madison condemned the proposal, in part, on the ground
that "[i]t involves a monopoly, which affects the equal rights of every citizen." Appendix
A: Madison's Speech on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, in Barnett, 2
Rights Retained by the People, at 423 (cited in note 6).
62. Charles L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in Barnett, 1
Rights Retained by the People at 345 (cited in note 38).
63. The distinction between regulation and prohibition is not always easy to main-
taln in practice. Any regulation of liberty necessarily prohibits its exercise in ways that
are contrary to the regulation. So, for example, time, place, and manner regulations of
speech in public spaces necessarily prohibit speech that conflicts with these regulations.
Still, a regulation of speech should not be intended to effectuate a prohibition, and at the
extremes this distinction may be quite clear. Thus, it is not difficult to distinguish the
regulation of the liberty to use intoxicating drugs from a prohibition of such use. For a
discussion of how the existence of "hard cases" of constitutional interpretation does not
preclude the existence of "easy cases," see Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 399 (1985).
64. The prevailing orthodoxy is that a presumption of constitutionality applies un-
less a particular enactment violates an enumerated fundamental right, affects a discrete
and insular minority group, or affects the electorial process. See United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Recently, however, Justice Stevens
argued that the refusal of government to regulate a particular action could be justified, if
challenged, by a presumption of freedom: "Freedom is a blessing. Regulation is some-
times necessary, but it is always burdensome. A decision not to regulate the way in which
an owner chooses to enjoy the benefits of an improvement to his own property is ade-
quately justified by a presumption in favor of freedom." F.C.C. v. Beach Communica-
tions, Inc, -U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2105 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring). whatever
encouragement is provided by Justice Stevens concurrence is undercut by the opinion of
Justice Thomas, which rests heavily on "a strong presumption of validity." Id. at 2102.
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classical liberal natural rights theorist-even the most liberta-
rian-has ever identified the liberty protected by natural rights
with the freedom to do anything one wills.65 There has always
existed at least implicitly a distinction between liberty and li-
cense.66 So it is no infringement upon a person's natural rights to
prevent her from violating the rights of another and the pre-
sumption of liberty would be inapt, except insofar as it is neces-
sary to place the onus of proof on those who would argue that a
particular type of action is violative of another's rights.
How is the baseline distinction between a rightful exercise of
liberty (that is presumptively immune from governmental restric-
tion) and a wrongful exercise of liberty (license) to be estab-
lished, and by whom? Traditionally, this distinction between
rightful and wrongful conduct was provided by the common law
which determined a person's legal rights. Consider the following
explication of the "common law" by Chancellor George Wythe, a
distinguished judge and holder of the first Law Chair in the
United States, in the case of Page v. Pendleton:
The position in the sixth article of our bill of rights, namely,
that men are not bound by laws to which they have not, by
Ironically, given the fear that he would use natural law to strike down offending legisla-
tion, Justice Thomas enthusiastically embraced the prevailing view that
those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden
"to negative every conceivable basis which might support it".... Moreover,
because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a
statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.... In
other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.
Id. Justice Stevens took issue with this standard: "In my view, this formulation sweeps
too broadly, for it is difficult to imagine a legislative classification that could not be sup-
ported by a 'reasonably conceivable state of facts.' Judicial review under the 'conceivable
set of facts' test is tantamount to no review at all." Id. at 2106 n.3 (Stevens J.,
concurring).
65. Compare Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 171 (Basic Books, 1974)
("My property rights in my knife allow me to leave it where I will, but not in your chest.")
with Republica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 330 n* (Pa. 1788) ("[Tjhough the law
allows a man the free use of his arm, or the possession of a weapon, yet it does not
authorize him to plunge a dagger in the breast of an inoffensive neighbor." [statement of
representative William Lewis to the Pennsylvania General Assembly]).
66. See, e.g., John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 288-89 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge U. Press, 2d ed. 1967).
But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of License .... The
State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life,
Health, Liberty, or Possessions.
Although I disagree with the implications he draws concerning the role of judicial review,
a recent insightful discussion of how natural rights theorists treated this issue is provided
by Philip Hamburger. See Hamburger, 102 Yale LJ. at 922-953 (cited in note 15).
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themselves, or by representatives of their election, assented, is
not true of unwritten or common law, that is, of the law of
nature, called common law, because it is common to all man-
kind .... They are laws which men, who did not ordain them,
have not power to abrogate.67
That is, in contrast with constitutional law, which provides rules
for the conduct of government agents, the common law of prop-
erty, tort, contract, restitution, agency, etc. provides principles of
right conduct to regulate the conduct of persons towards each
other. For example, when one injures another and this injury is
considered to be "tortious," then it is deemed to be wrongful and
a duty to compensate is held to exist. A major portion of the first
year of most law schools is devoted to studying the issue of right-
ful conduct. This body of rules and principles was at the time of
the framing of the Constitution and largely remains almost en-
tirely judge-made. Moreover, in the United States federal system
it was and still is primarily made by state court judges. Even fed-
eral judges today acting pursuant to their powers in diversity
cases attempt to discern state law and consider themselves bound
by it. When federal judges must decide these state law questions
in the absence of state court precedent, they may be "overruled"
by subsequent state court decisions.
Thus there has evolved a division of labor. The judiciary in
the several states were primarily responsible for determining
rightful from wrongful conduct, while judges in the federal
courts, beginning most famously with the case of McCulloch v.
Maryland,68 were responsible for assessing the necessity and pro-
priety of federal restrictions on otherwise rightful conduct. With
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the federal govern-
ment's jurisdiction was expanded to include protecting citizens
from rights infringements by their own state governments.69 This
67. Page v. Pendleton (1793), in George Wythe, Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the
High Court of Chancery 214 n.(e) (B.B. Minor, ed., J.W. Randolph, 1852) as it appears in
Sherry, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 186 (cited in note 1). Cf. John S. Baker, Jr., The Natural and
the Positive in American Law, in R.A. Herrera, James Lehreberger and M.E. Bradford
eds., Saints, Sovereigns and Scholars: Studies in Honor of Frederick D. Wilhelmsen 157,
163 (Peter Lang, 1993) ("Originally common law was viewed as the embodiment of natu-
ral law. Then it became understood in historicist terms as simply custom and eventually
in purely positivist terms as judge-made law.").
68. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
69. Thus the fact that the entire Bill of Rights, including the Ninth Amendment, was
originally intended to apply only to the federal government-as the Supreme Court de-
cided in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)-does not mean that the Ninth
Amendment is irrelevant to actions of state governments. Of necessity, the people re-
tained their inalienable rights against the states as well as the federal government. This is
evidenced by the swift incorporation of provisions similar to the Ninth Amendment into
[Vol. 12:93
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division of labor was not, of course, ever quite this neat. It was
also thought appropriate for legislatures, especially on the state
level, to intervene in the common law process, especially when
the doctrine of precedent was thought to prevent a particular ju-
dicial reform.
Still, though this complicates the story a bit, it is important
to bear in mind that such legislative interventions were supposed
to be and in fact were comparatively rare. Determination of pri-
vate rights were traditionally and remain overwhelmingly the
province of state court judges. And, even with sweeping statu-
tory innovation such as the Uniform Commercial Code, legisla-
tive alterations of private law rights remain relatively rare.70 Far
more frequently has the common law been affected by the opin-
ions of the non-profit American Law Institute through their
highly authoritative series of "restatements" of the law.
So emerges the great outlines of an institutional allocation
of responsibility in discerning and protecting the background nat-
ural rights of all persons: State common law processes determine
the rights that each citizen enjoys against others, while state and
federal judges are authorized to protect citizens from having these
rights infringed by state and federal governments. Both compo-
nents of this institutional division of labor have long existed.71
many state constitutions after Madison devised this express restraint. However, it was the
Fourteenth Amendment that extended jurisdiction to the federal government to protect
these rights from state government infringement, thereby altering the preexisting jurisdic-
tional arrangement. This is not to claim that the Fourteenth Amendment somehow "in-
corporated" the Ninth, but that the Privileges or Immunities Clause extended the federal
jurisdiction to protect the enumerated and unenumerated rights retained by the people
against infringement by state governments.
70. It is a tricky, but necessary, business to distinguish those legislative actions that
are a proper codification, regulation, systemization, or correction of common law rights
from those that constitute state governmental interference with these rights. While this
problem merits further discussion, it does not affect the efficacy of federal scrutiny of
federal legislation that interferes with otherwise rightful exercises of liberty. Nor does it
affect scrutiny of the clear majority of state actions that do not and cannot purport to be
determining the private rights that citizens have against each other. This leaves only the
important question of determining when state legislation purporting to improve upon the
scheme of common law rights is actually infringing the relatively abstract background
natural rights of its citizens. I do not think, however, that this question can be shirked
solely because it may be difficult to identify a general theory that distinguishes genuine
regulation from improper infringements of liberty. Without such a theory, citizens and
their freedoms are left to the tender mercies of legislative majorities who may represent
either majority or minority factions.
71. Professor Hamburger has recently offered an insightful interpretation of the re-
lationship that the founding generation saw between natural and civil law. He notes that
while Americans unquestionably conceived of freedom of speech as a natural right, they
frequently discussed the extent of freedom of speech and press without alluding
to ideas of natural liberty or natural law. Sometimes, for example, Americans
simply defined the freedom in terms of common law restraints upon it. Even
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My argument is that the legitimacy of the statute-making
processes governed by the Constitution would be enhanced,
however, if they are linked.
But does not this constitutional scheme place altogether too
much power in state and federal judges? As I have already ar-
gued above, such reliance is unavoidable in a constitutional sys-
tem in which courts are the only relatively "independent
tribunals of justice" available to protect citizens from majority
and minority factions operating through representative govern-
ment.72 Moreover, the problem is typically grossly overrated.73
When Congress disagrees with an assessment by the Supreme
Court of the United States that its enactments have violated the
background natural rights of the people, it has the power to pro-
pose a constitutional amendment. The President may take any
disagreement (or agreement) with past Supreme Court rulings
into account in selecting judicial nominees, and the Senate may
express its views during the confirmation process. A majority of
the Supreme Court may well protect rights at variance from the
opinion of the overwhelming majority of the people for a time,
when Americans talked about the freedom of speech and press as a broader
principle or generality, they often distinguished between liberty and license,
without clearly alluding to natural rights or natural law.
Hamburger, 102 Yale LJ. at 953 (cited in note 15). The distinction between liberty and
license needs to be defined conventionally because the concept of natural rights is too
abstract to permit all but the most extreme of cases to be decided deductively from first
principles. As Hamburger correctly observes, "being only a very abstract manner of rea-
soning, natural law was typically not understood to require the adoption of a particular
set of civil laws. Moreover, though considered immutable, natural law was understood to
permit variations in civil laws to accommodate the different circumstances in which such
laws would operate." Id. at 937. However, because more than one set of legal rules is
consistent with the abstract injunctions of natural rights, this does not mean that every set
of legal rules is consistent. Particular common-law formulations can be criticized for be-
ing inconsistent with abstract natural rights and consequently unjust. The issue being
discussed here, however, is who makes this decision, and traditionally this was primarily
the province of state court judges, with occasional correction by state legislatures.
Where I part company with Professor Hamburger is over his claim that "[a] failure of
the constitution to reflect natural law was a ground for altering or abandoning the consti-
tution rather than for making a claim in court." Id. He has missed a crucial third possibil-
ity that was unlikely to have been missed by the framers, who had practiced civil
disobedience long before they became revolutionaries: that the failure of a constitution to
respect natural rights was a ground for disregarding laws that are promulgated pursuant to
its authority.
72. Although this proposal makes the most out of the constitutional scheme that we
currently have, it is not the only constitutional arrangement imaginable. I have specu-
lated on more radical possibilities in Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society:
Part Two-Crime Prevention and the Legal Order, Crim. Just. Ethics, 30, 37-49 (Winter/
Spring 1986) (describing a polycentric legal order).
73. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993)
(arguing that courts are not systematically less majoritarian than the political branches of
government).
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but life is alas all too short. This fact plus our method of judicial
selection assures that, for better or worse, in the not-so-long run
any opinion about the rights of the people which is opposed by
an overwhelming majority of the people will be reversed.
These various mechanisms by which Supreme Court rulings
protective of liberty can be challenged may take some time and
effort to be effective, but this delay is in most instances salutary
and, in any event, is absolutely essential if legislatures are not to
be judges in their own cases when their acts restrict the liberty of
citizens. The more likely deficiency of this proposal in practice is
that government judges are not sufficiently independent of gov-
ernment or of a majority faction to provide "an impenetrable
bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive."74 For this reason prior rulings upholding the exercise
of such powers should always be subject to reconsideration when
circumstances have changed.
CONCLUSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF LAW
Let me summarize the analysis I have presented here. First,
I contended that it is impossible to avoid getting normative about
whether the unenumerated rights retained by the people merit
judicial protection. For the legitimacy of the enterprise estab-
lished by the Constitution depends on its ability to reliably pro-
duce enactments that bind the citizenry in conscience. And we
cannot be sure that any enactment restricting the rightful liberty
of a citizen has this binding quality unless we are certain that it
has been scrutinized by an independent tribunal of justice to see
if it is necessary and proper. Thus the background natural rights
of all persons require that a burden should be placed on those
who seek to restrict liberty to justify their actions, rather than on
the citizen to justify her freedom. In our constitutional scheme,
this can be accomplished by linking state law determinations of
rightful conduct with state and federal scrutiny of legislative and
executive restrictions of such conduct.
Although we may not wish to know how either laws or sau-
sages are made, we had better be sure that the processes of both
lawmaking and sausage-making include a quality-control mecha-
nism that ensures that the product being purveyed is safe and
74. The phrase is, once again, Madison's. See 1 The Debates and Proceedings in the
Congress of the United States at 457 (cited in note 36) (Statement of James Madison),
reprinted in Barnett, 1 The Rights Retained by the People, at 51 (cited in note 38). See,
e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of
confining citizens of Japanese ancestry in detention camps).
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wholesome. That such quality-control processes are imperfect in
no way undermines their importance. This is particularly true
when-as was tragically demonstrated once again in Waco-
whether dealing with food or force, life and death may hang in
the balance.
